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Audiotapes Heard at Preliminary Criminal
Hearings are Regarded as Public Judicial Records
Subject to the Presumption of Openness Associated
with Criminal Trials and are Accessible to the
Public for Duplication: Commonwealth v. Upshur
RECORDS - PUBLIC ACCESS - COURT RECORDS - TRIAL - The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an audiotape played at a
public preliminary criminal hearing was a public judicial record or
document; therefore, it is subject to the presumption of openness,
and the public is entitled to have access to review and copy such
evidence.
Commonwealth v. Upshur, 924 A.2d 642 (Pa. 2007).
During a preliminary hearing before a magistrate judge, a
WPXI-TV' reporter heard an audiotape of the criminal defendant,
Ms. Jaime Lynn Upshur, in a homicide prosecution threatening
one of the asserted victims. 2 Petitioner, WPXI, filed a motion to
intervene seeking a copy of the tape for broadcast purposes. 3 The
magistrate judge denied the request, reasoning that he was not
authorized to grant such a motion. 4 The matter was further pur-
sued in the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas by WPXI,
which filed a motion to intervene, alleging it had a right to access
the audiotape and copy it for broadcast and that a transcript of the
audiotape would be insufficient.
5
In February 2004, the defendant was charged with multiple
criminal offenses, including two counts of criminal homicide, as a
result of her alleged involvement in a collision among numerous
vehicles. 6 Several months prior to the incident, Ms. Timira
1. WPXI-TV is owned by Cox Enterprises and is an affiliate of NBC. See Cox Enter-
prises, http://www.coxenterprises.com/corp/home.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2008).
2. Commonwealth v. Upshur (Upshur II), 924 A.2d 642 (Pa. 2007).
3. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 645.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. Ms. Upshur was charged with two counts of criminal homicide, two counts of
homicide by vehicle, three counts of aggravated assault, two counts of reckless endanger-
ment and one count each of simple assault, speeding, and reckless driving. Commonwealth
v. Upshur (Upshur 11), 882 A.2d 499 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
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Brown, one of the asserted victims, had apparently initiated a
three-way conversation between herself, her boyfriend who was
incarcerated in the Allegheny County Jail, and Ms. Upshur.7 This
conversation was recorded onto an audiotape, consistent with the
jail's policy of recording all the inmates' incoming and outgoing
phone calls.8 Ms. Upshur may or may not have been aware that
the conversation was being recorded. 9 As part of its prima facie
case, the Commonwealth played the audiotape before a magistrate
judge and all who were present at the preliminary hearing, among
whom was the WPXI reporter. 10 The contents of the tape revealed
that Ms. Upshur directed allegedly threatening statements to Ms.
Brown. "
After the magistrate denied its request, WPXI filed a motion for
leave to intervene with the Common Pleas Court of Allegheny
County.12 WPXI sought to make a copy of the tape for broadcast
purposes to air before the trial began. 13 The court granted WPXI's
motion, emphasizing the fact that the tape had been played to
everyone present at the preliminary hearing and concluded that
the audiotape was a public judicial record to which the presump-
tion of openness 14 associated with criminal proceedings applied.
15
Therefore, in accordance with Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker,
access to the audiotape was required. 16
The Commonwealth appealed, and the superior court reversed,
concluding that the audiotape was not a public judicial record
when WPXI made the request for access because it was neither
part of the record nor entered into evidence or filed with the
court.17 The superior court also stated that none of the considera-





12. Commonwealth v. Upshur (Upshur), No. 410, slip op. (C.P. Allegheny Co. April 1,
2004). "This Court has long held that a motion to intervene is an appropriate method for
the news media to assert the public right of access to information concerning criminal
cases." See Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 414, 416 n.1 (Pa. 1987).
13. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 645.
14. The Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[all courts shall be open . PA.
CONST. art. I, § 11. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has also stated that "[ciriminal trials
in the United States have, by historical tradition, and under the First Amendment, been
deemed presumptively open to public scrutiny and this 'presumption of openness inheres in
the very nature of the criminal trial under our system of justice."' Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d
at 417 (quoting Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 573 (1980)).
15. Upshur, No. 410, slip op. at 3 (C.P. Allegheny Co. April 1, 2004).
16. Id.
17. Upshur II, 882 A.2d at 501.
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tions set forth in Fenstermaker were present and explained that
allowing WPXI access to the audiotape would not discourage per-
jury, would not enhance the performance of police and prosecu-
tors, and would not promote the public perception of fairness or
openness in the court. 18 The court determined that access to the
audiotape was not required, reasoning that the tape's content was
available in transcript and that the audiotape had a potentially
inflammatory effect if broadcasted. 19 Judge Popovich dissented,
stating that once heard, the audiotape had become part of the re-
cord and the Commonwealth's assertion that the broadcast of the
tape would be potentially inflammatory was not a sufficient basis
for denying WPXI access. 20
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court then permitted WPXI an Al-
lowance of Appeal for the determination of two issues: (1) whether
the audiotape was a public judicial record or document and thus
subject to the common-law right of openness to the public; and (2)
whether the court of common pleas abused its discretion by grant-
ing WPXI's motion. 21
WPXI argued that the definition of public judicial records and
documents should be broad and not predicated upon the formal
filing of such exhibits with the court. 22 Such a definition would
severely limit the public's access and defeat the purposes of the
openness requirement. 23 WPXI further argued that if the defini-
tion of judicial records and documents were interpreted narrowly,
the prosecutor would have arbitrary discretion as to what should
be formally filed with the court and, ultimately, what the public
would be permitted to examine. 24 WPXI also claimed that, since
the audiotape was played as part of the Commonwealth's prima
18. Id. at 503.
19. Id. at 505. Specifically the court determined that "[i]n a situation such as the one
before this Court, a finding that the audiotape is not a public judicial document prevents
the broadcast and dissemination of highly inflammatory and possibly prejudicial informa-
tion until after a court has ruled on its admissibility." Id at 503. The court further noted
"the fact that WPXI was present when the tape was played and could have requested a
transcript of the proceedings, but instead insisted upon a copy of the tape is indicative of
the sensationalistic value of the audiotape." Id.
20. Id. at 506 (Popovich, J., dissenting). Judge Popovich reasoned: "As I would have
found that VPXI could have recorded the preliminary hearing with its own recording de-
vice, I believe that WPXI could have access to the audiotape to make a copy of the phone
call that was played at the preliminary hearing." Id.
21. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 646.
22. Id. at 648. WPXI argued that "it would elevate form over substance to determine a
document or record's status simply on the basis of whether the item contained an official





facie case and was instrumental to the district judge's decision-
making process, the tape was both public and judicial in charac-
ter. 2
5
In response, the Commonwealth conceded that, if the audiotape
were deemed admissible, it would be subject to public access; but
it argued that since the audiotape was never formally filed with
the court, entered into evidence, or otherwise made a part of the
record, it was not a public judicial record or document, and there-
fore the right of openness did not apply.26 Additionally, the Com-
monwealth stated that to allow the public access to exhibits put
forward at preliminary hearings would place a serious burden
upon prosecutors, who would then need to scrutinize every piece of
evidence put forward to demonstrate a prima facie case in order to
avoid risking the defendant's right to a fair trial.
27
Justice Saylor delivered the opinion of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court, which began with a discussion of the origin of the
common-law right of access to public judicial records and docu-
ments. 28 This right was based upon the presumption that judicial
proceedings should be open to the public in order to provide a
check on the criminal justice system, to ensure a fair execution of
the process, and to promote public confidence and understand-
ing. 29 However, the court explained that not all documents are
subject to this right. 30 As set forth in Fenstermaker, in order to be
subject to the common-law right of access, documents or records
must fall into the category of public judicial records or documents
before they are made available to the public.
31
In contrast to the superior court's application of Fenstermaker,
the supreme court stated that allowing public access to prelimi-
nary hearing exhibits would promote public confidence in the fair-
ness and efficacy of the criminal justice system and that the bene-
25. Id.
26. Upshur IH, 924 A.2d at 649.
27. Id.
[It would not be in the public interest to allow the media to access exhibits pre-
sented at preliminary hearings because doing so would have a chilling effect
upon prosecutors, as they would continually need to consider the possibility
that pre-trial dissemination of evidence presented solely for the purpose of
demonstrating a prima facie case would risk the defendant's right to a fair
trial.
Id.
28. Id. at 647.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 648.
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fits of the presumption of openness would not be diminished by
the fact that the proceedings were at an early stage. 32
The court then rejected the Commonwealth's argument that
public judicial records or documents must be formally filed with
the court or otherwise entered into the record.33 The majority ex-
plained that the common-law right of access is predicated upon
the public's interest in knowing about the circumstances of the
trial, not just upon the public's interest in knowing about exhibits
filed with the court. 34 The majority then examined another con-
sideration in determining public judicial record or document
status-whether the magistrate judge based his decision on the
content of the audiotape. 35 Agreeing with WPXI, the court con-
cluded that the audiotape was the type of material upon which a
judicial decision was based. 36 The court held that the audiotape
was a public judicial record or document, reasoning that the tape
was previously divulged to the public because it was played at an
open preliminary hearing and was available in transcript form. 37
Having concluded that the audiotape was a public judicial re-
cord or document, the court addressed whether WPXI was entitled
to a copy of the tape. 38 The court explained that such classifica-
tions do not necessarily require the court to make records or
documents available to the public. 39 Access may be denied where
the party opposing disclosure has obtained a court order to seal
the exhibits. 40 While discretion is left to the trial court to deter-
mine whether the presumption of openness is outweighed by the
possible harm that may come from the release of exhibits, the
burden of showing such damaging effects is on the party opposing
the motion. 41




36. Upshur IH, 924 A.2d at 651.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 420.
[Tihe right to inspect judicial documents is not absolute, and courts do have
supervisory power over their records and files. Where the presumption of
openness attached to a public judicial document is outweighed by circum-
stances warranting closure of the document to public inspection, access to the
document may be denied.
Id.
40. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 651.
41. Id. The court recognized that the trial court must inspect the documents in camera
before making a decision whether to seal the document or record. Id.
Summer 2008
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Consequently, the court noted that the Commonwealth failed to
offer any evidence that releasing the audiotape would be highly
inflammatory. 42 The majority explained that neither pretrial pub-
licity, nor suggesting the documents could be detrimental to the
fairness of Ms. Upshur's case, was enough to outweigh the pre-
sumption of openness. 43 Moreover, the court agreed with the
Commonwealth that, while the questionable admissibility of evi-
dence may be a factor for the trial court to consider, admissibility
would not itself be conclusive.44
Therefore, having concluded that the audiotape was a public ju-
dicial record or document and finding that the common-law right
of access was applicable, the court held that WPXI was permitted
to access and to copy the tape. 45 Accordingly, the court found that
the trial court had not abused its discretion and reversed the order
of the superior court. 46 Several of the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court justices filed concurring and dissenting opinions.
47
Agreeing with the majority's decision that WPXI should be
given access to the content of the preliminary hearing, but dissat-
isfied with the actual release of the audiotape, Chief Justice
Cappy filed a concurring opinion. 48 He stated that he could find
no reason why WPXI should be granted custody of the original
tape, which may lead to security concerns. 49 Instead, Chief Jus-
tice Cappy advocated for the trial court's discretion in determining
the best way to make the public judicial records and documents
available to the public. 50 Thus, he concluded that WPXI had no
right to the original, but rather had a right to the content of the
tape as manifested in the preliminary hearing transcript. 51
Justice Castille also filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice
Eakin joined, emphasizing his belief that the trial judge was only
required to grant access to the transcript of the audiotape and not
the tape itself.5 2 These justices opined that the benefits afforded
42. Id. at 652.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 653.
46. Id. at 654.
47. Id.
48. Id. (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
49. Id.
50. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 654 (Cappy, C.J., concurring).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 654-55 (Castille, J., concurring). Justice Eakin joined Justice Castiie's con-
curring opinion. Id. Castille emphasized that the
appellant has no "right" of access to a copy of the actual audio tape recording,
as opposed to the preliminary hearing transcript, which contains the verbatim
Vol. 46662
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by the common-law right to access public judicial records and
documents are not bolstered by providing WPXI with the audio-
tape. 53 The presumption of openness does not mean that the
courts are required to provide the media the most dramatic or
sensational form of information.5 4 The form of the information
and its release should be a matter of discretion for the trial
judge. 55
Justice Baldwin filed a concurring opinion similar to those writ-
ten by Justice Cappy and Justice Castille. 56 Justice Baldwin be-
lieved that there was a substantive difference, which the court did
not address, between the transcript and the audiotape and that
the court was not required to grant WPXI access to anything be-
yond the transcript. 57 The benefits of providing the actual tape, as
opposed to the transcript, were minimal and were far outweighed
by both the danger of an unfair trial and by the privacy interests
of the three individuals heard on the tape and their families.58
Pointing out that federal courts have addressed this issue in
greater depth and frequency than the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, Justice Baldwin stated there has been a split in the circuits
concerning the strength of the presumption of openness. 59 How-
ever, in most cases where access was granted, the trial concerned
a public figure. 6° Thus, Justice Baldwin believed that the major-
ity was correct in concluding that WPXI had a right to the infor-
mation on the audiotape, but believed that the court erred in
granting WPXI access to the actual audiotape-especially since no
admissibility determination had been made. 61
substance of the recording. The courts are not obliged to provide the media
with the form of information which is "most dramatic or sensational," or which
might be best for programming and rating purposes.
Id. at 654.
53. Id. at 654.
54. Id.
55. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 655 (Castille, J., concurring).
56. Id. (Baldwin, J., concurring).
57. Id. at 655.
58. Id. at 656. Justice Baldwin did not take a completely pessimistic view of the media,
acknowledging that "many media organizations have ethical policies limiting their publica-
tion of the names of victims of crime" but was skeptical that "the courts and the legislature
do not limit the media's ability to publicize the information obtained." Id. at 658. She also
scrutinized the theory Judge Popovich put forward in his dissenting opinion in Upshur II,
that WPXI could have used its own recording device. Id. Baldwin wrote, "I find that a
presumption of access to audio and video tapes is difficult to reconcile with the rules propa-
gated by this Court which prohibit recording of courtroom proceedings." Id.
59. Id. at 657.
60. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 657 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 659.
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Justice Fitzgerald, on the other hand, filed a dissenting opinion
expressing concern that providing the actual audiotape to the pub-
lic would undermine the integrity of the criminal trial.62 He also
disagreed with the decision that the audiotape was a public judi-
cial record. 63 However, he believed WPXI should have had access
to the transcript of the tape.
64
The common-law right of access to judicial records and docu-
ments has long been recognized in the United States, predating
the Federal Constitution. 65 The right is believed to have origi-
nated in England as early as 1372.66 The underlying purposes for
the common-law right of access to judicial records and documents
are to keep the public informed of the workings of the government
and to provide a check on the justice system. 67 Under the English
common law, members of the public seeking access to judicial re-
cords or documents were required to have a proprietary interest or
a need to use them in a legal action. 68 Unlike the English common
law, United States courts acknowledged that every member of the
public was entitled to access public judicial records or documents,
regardless of their purpose for obtaining them. 69 Although this
right was applied in tandem with a presumption in favor of public
access, it was not absolute and has always been subject to the
principle that the court could limit the right of access to prevent
improper use of the record or document. 70 In order to determine if
62. Id. at 659 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1260 (D.C. 1976). See David Marburger,
Comment, In Defense of Broadcaster Access to Evidentiary Video and Audio Tapes, 44 U.
PiTT. L. REV. 647 (1983).
66. 46 Edw. 3 (1372). See Marburger, supra note 65, at 650.
67. Marburger, supra note 65, at 650-51.
The policy underpinnings of the common-law right emphasized most by Ameri-
can courts focus on the principle of promoting effective self-government. That
is, by freely providing public access to government records, the governed will be
in a better position to evaluate government and to choose intelligently the per-
sons who will govern and the way they will govern. Thus, access to govern-
mental information enables the people to learn about the operation of govern-
ment, to oversee their public servants, and to exercise their constitutional
rights (to vote, to petition government for the redress of grievances and the
like) in an informed manner.
Id. at 650.
68. Id.
69. Id. "American courts have been considerably more liberal than their English coun-
terparts in enforcing the common-law right to inspect records. Since the late nineteenth
century, American courts have recognized that all citizens have a right of access to judicial
and other government records as a principle consistent with democracy and open govern-
ment." Id. at 650.
70. Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598, 602 (1978).
Vol. 46
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access should be limited, the court applied a balancing test, weigh-
ing the public interest against the interests advanced by the op-
posing party. 71 Traditionally, the common-law right was only ap-
plied to written government documents, and there was very little
litigation over the matter. 72 With the advent of modern technol-
ogy, the common-law right of access was used more frequently,
and the scope of the common-law right of access to public judicial
records or documents was expanded.
73
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court recognized the com-
mon-law right of access to public judicial records or documents in
Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc.74 In connection with the
Watergate prosecution, several audiotapes of conversations Presi-
dent Nixon recorded while in the White House Oval Office and his
private office in the Executive Office Building were played before
the jury and the public during the trial. 75 Transcripts of the tapes
were provided to the public. 76 Warner Communications wanted to
copy, broadcast, and sell portions of the tapes. 77 At issue in the
case was whether the common-law right of access required that
the public be allowed physical access to the audiotapes and per-
mitted to copy them.7 8 The Court cited several factors that should
be weighed to determine if public access should be granted:
whether substantial access has already been given to the public,
privacy concerns, the impropriety of facilitating the commercial
use of the record, and the availability of an alternative means of
access. 79 While the Court stated that the common-law right was
71. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 602.
72. Marburger, supra note 65, at 653.
73. Id. "In connection with this reasoning, the common-law right was originally exer-
cised most often only in connection with written government documents, possibly because
they could be manually copied." Id.
74. 435 U.S. 589.
75. Nixon, 435 U.S at 591, 594. There were two copies made of the subpoenaed tapes,
one of which was retained by the district court and the other was given to the Special
Prosecutor. Id. at 593. Warner Communications sought access to those retained by the
district court. Id.
76. Id. at 594. The reels of tape containing the conversation were entered into evi-
dence, but the transcripts were not, although widely circulated by the press. Id.
77. Id. The district court held that the common-law right of access entitled Warner
Communications to copy the tapes; however, they were not permitted to do so until a much
later time after the trial and all possible avenues of appeal were exhausted in order to
preserve the right to a fair trial. Id. at 595. The court of appeals granted Warner Commu-
nications immediate access, stating that a mere possibility of prejudice is not a sufficient
basis to overcome the presumption of openness. Id. at 596.
78. Id. at 609.
79. Id. at 599-601, 606, The Court noted that "the fact that substantial access already
has been accorded the press and the public is simply one factor to be weighed." Id. at 599
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applicable, it denied Warner Communications physical access to
the audiotapes that were in the possession of the district court.8 0
In applying the balancing test, the Court did not weigh all of the
factors because Congress had provided for the release of the tapes
when it enacted the Presidential Recordings and Materials Pres-
ervation Act.81 The Act tipped the balance in favor of denying dis-
closure since an alternative means was available to the public,
which satisfied the common-law right.
8 2
In Commonwealth v. Fenstermaker,8 3 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court acknowledged the common-law right of access to pub-
lic judicial documents discussed in Nixon, but stated that the right
had not been fully defined in Pennsylvania.8 4 The court in Fen-
stermaker considered affidavits of probable cause upon which ar-
rest warrants for three men were based. 85 After the arrests and
arraignments, Call-Chronicle Newspapers filed a motion for leave
to intervene, seeking permission to inspect and copy the affida-
vits.86 At issue in this case was whether the common-law right of
access to judicial documents attached to affidavits of probable
cause supporting arrest warrants.8 7
When considering whether the common-law right required dis-
closure, the court identified several policy considerations in allow-
ing public access to the affidavits, such as the discouragement of
perjury in the affidavits, the encouragement of police and prosecu-
tors to establish sufficient cause before filing an affidavit, the dis-
couragement of erroneous decisions and decisions based on parti-
ality, and the promotion of public perception of fairness of the ju-
dicial process.88 The court also emphasized that the public had a
80. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 609.
81. Id. at 603. See The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, 44
U.S.C. § 2102 (2000).
82. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 603. The Court determined that it "need not decide how the
balance would be struck" because, "[t]here is in this case an additional, unique element that
was neither advanced by the parties nor given appropriate consideration by the courts
below." Id. The Court further explained that "[in the Presidential Recordings Act, Con-
gress directed the Administrator of General Services to take custody" of the tapes and
documents in order to preserve and screen the materials. Id.
83. 530 A.2d 414.
84. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 419.
85. Id. at 415-16. The three men were all arrested and charged with homicide, rape,
indecent assault, conspiracy, and underage drinking. Id. at 415.
86. Id. at 416.
87. Id. The court pointed out that neither party argued that the common-law right
attached before the arrests had been made. Id.
88. Id. at 418. The court summarized the considerations as:
to assure the public that justice is done even-handedly and fairly; to discourage
perjury and the misconduct of participants; to prevent decisions based on secret
666 Vol. 46
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particular interest in the criminal process. 89 By its very nature, a
criminal act is an act against the public that is prosecuted on the
public's behalf; therefore, the court determined that members of
the public should have a fastidious interest in the criminal justice
system. 90
Moreover, the court stated that the threshold question for de-
termining whether the common-law right was applicable was
whether the documents sought were categorized as public judicial
documents. 91 The court then specified that any documents that
are filed with magistrates are considered judicial in character. 92
Further, the category of public documents was expanded to in-
clude any documents upon which a magistrate bases his or her
decision to issue an arrest warrant. 93 Next, the court expounded
upon what considerations are necessary to determine whether a
document is to be considered public. 94 In addition to the policy
considerations discussed earlier, the court declared that docu-
ments filed with the court become part of the record, enhancing
the public nature of those documents. 95  While the common-law
bias or partiality; to prevent individuals from feeling that the law should be
taking into the hands of private citizens; to satisfy the natural desire to see jus-
tice done; to provide for community catharsis; to promote public confidence in
government and assurance that the system of judicial remedy does in fact
work; to promote the stability of government by allowing access to its workings,
thus assuring citizens that government and the courts are worthy of their con-
tinued loyalty and support; to promote an understanding of our system of gov-
ernment and courts.
Id at 417.
89. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 417. The court stated that:
The nature of criminal law is such that it punishes offenses against the collec-
tive public ... and, accordingly, members of the public have an interest in ob-
serving criminal justice processes to be assured that offenses perpetrated
against them are dealt with in a manner that is fair to their interests, and fair
to the interests of the accused.
Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Bovaird, 95 A.2d 173, 176 (Pa. 1953)).
90. Id. at 417.
91. Id. at 418.
92. Id.
93. Id. "It is clear, however, that documents that are filed with magistrates constitute
'judicial' documents, for magistrates (i.e., 'justices of the peace) are part of the Common-
wealth's unified judicial system ... and magistrates are by statutory definition considered
to be 'courts' ...." Id.
Further, documents upon which a magistrate bases a decision to issue an ar-
rest warrant are clearly judicial in character, for the decision to issue a war-
rant is itself a judicial one reflecting a determination that the affidavits and
the information contained therein provide a sufficient basis upon which to jus-
tify an arrest.
Id.




right of access was broadly construed, the court limited the right
by asserting that courts ultimately have supervisory power over
their records and that access should be denied where the pre-
sumption of openness is outweighed by circumstances requiring
the sealing of the documents.
96
Concluding that the affidavits were judicial in character, since
they were filed with the magistrate, the court applied the balanc-
ing test, weighing the public's interests against the Common-
wealth's argument that the arrest warrant affidavits could have
information that would be detrimental to the defendant's right to
a fair trial.97 The court determined that the public's interests
were not outweighed, stating that a mere request by a party that
the record be sealed is not sufficient to overcome the public's in-
terests, and affirmed that such a decision was a matter of trial
court discretion. 98 Therefore, the court granted Call-Chronicle
Newspapers access to the affidavits of probable cause. 99
Although the presumption of openness associated with the
common-law right of access to judicial documents was established
in Fenstermaker, the extent of what constituted a judicial docu-
ment needed to be further delineated in Stenger v. Lehigh Valley
Hospital Center. 10 0 In that case, the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that documents gathered during discovery were private and
were not considered a judicial record.101 In Stenger, the Morning
Call, a Lehigh County newspaper, sought access to depositions
that had been taken in preparation for trial. 10 2 In reaching its
decision, the superior court stated that the discovery process is
essentially a private process, and were it subject to the common-
96. Id. at 420.
97. Id. at 418, 420.
98. Id. at 420. The court further explained that the burden is upon the District Attor-
neys or defense counsel to move swiftly to seal the record, but that this burden was neces-
sary to effectuate the purposes behind the common-law right of access to public judicial
records or documents. Id at 421.
99. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 421.
100. 554 A.2d 954, 960 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
101. Stenger, 554 A.2d at 960. "We find that the discovery documents at issue are not
judicial records, and that The Morning Call has no common-law right of access to inspect
this information." Id. The court noted that "discovery is essentially a private process." Id.
at 961.
102. Id. at 955. The plaintiffs had brought an action against the Lehigh Valley Hospital
Center alleging that Ms. Stenger had contracted the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syn-
drome (AIDS) virus after she was transfused with blood contaminated with AIDS and that
her husband and son tested positive for exposure to the virus. Id. Upon motion by the




law right of access, there would be dire consequences to the litiga-
tion process. 103
In 1992, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court again addressed the
designation of what constituted a judicial document in PG Pub-
lishing Co. v. Commonwealth.10 4 This case involved an ongoing
criminal investigation concerning the kidnapping and murder of
Sally Weiner. 10 5 During the period between the suspect's arrest
and the date he was charged, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette filed a
motion to intervene seeking access to search warrants and sup-
porting affidavits in order to inspect and copy. 0 6 At issue in this
case was whether the common-law right of access attached to
search warrants and affidavits after they were executed, but be-
fore the accusatorial stages of the proceedings began. 1
0 7
In reaching its decision, the court reiterated what it held in
Fenstermaker, that a document is not made public in character
simply by its association with judicial proceedings. 08 Rather, the
court pointed again to the policy considerations, which had to be
taken into account when weighing the public interests against the
interests of the opposing party to determine if access was compul-
sory. 10 9 In addition to reaffirming the test set forth in Fenster-
maker, the court provided several factors determining if the cir-
cumstances necessitate the sealing of certain documents. 110 These
factors include: (1) if the defendant's right to a fair trial will be
affected, (2) if the safety of an informant must be protected, or (3)
103. Id. at 961. Specifically, the court posited that, were the common-law right to apply
to discovery, individuals would be reluctant to exercise their legal rights for fear that their
private lives would be openly scrutinized. Id. In addition, the court emphasized that "the
detrimental consequences to the discovery process would be grievous" because "not only
would voluntary discovery be chilled, but whatever discovery that did take place would be
almost exclusively oral." Id. Such oral discovery "is obviously undesirable because oral
discovery would foster misunderstanding and a lack of clarity for the litigants and for the
trial court." Id.
104. 614 A.2d 1106 (Pa. 1992).
105. PG Publ'g, 614 A.2d at 1106. Sally Weiner's husband, Harry Weiner, had received
a message from his wife that she had been kidnapped and that she was being ransomed.
Id. at 1107. Mr. Wiener received further instructions from a bag outside in the parking lot
of the bank where he worked. Id. He was to wait until he received further instructions via
radio, which never happened. Id. Sally Weiner's body was found two days later. Id.
106. Id. at 1107. The investigation continued after the suspect's arrest, during which
time the police obtained four search warrants. Id. The suspect was ultimately convicted of
first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Id. at 1107 n.1.
107. Id. at 1108. The District Attorney sought to seal the search warrants, but the mo-
tion was denied by the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County. Id at 1107.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. PG Publ'g, 614 A.2d at 1108.
Summer 2008 669
670 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 46
if the integrity of an ongoing criminal investigation may be com-
promised.11
The court concluded that search warrants and their supporting
affidavits are public judicial documents because they are both filed
with district justices and are documents upon which the district
judge bases a decision to issue a search warrant. 1 2 With regard
to the balancing test, the court mentioned that the need for se-
crecy associated with search warrants, one factor that weighs
against the public's interest, vanishes once it has been exe-
cuted. 113 However, the court declined to apply the balancing test
since it was unclear whether the trial court ever examined the
documents, and remanded the matter. "
4
Much like Stenger and PG Publishing, the Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court in Commonwealth v. Martinez115 again dealt with the
definition of a public judicial document in relation to the temporal
point in the proceedings, namely the sentencing phase. 16 Prior to
Martinez's sentencing, several people, including government offi-
cials, wrote letters requesting leniency in the sentencing. 7 These
letters were submitted by the defendant's counsel to the sentenc-
ing court."18 The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette filed a motion to inter-
vene seeking access to inspect and copy the letters."19 At issue in
this case was whether the letters provided to the sentencing court
111. Id.
112. Id.
There is no historical tradition of public access to search warrant proceedings.
As with arrest warrants, however, the search warrant application is filed with
district justices who are part of the Commonwealth's unified judicial system.
The documents upon which the district justice bases a decision to issue a
search warrant are also judicial in character, for the decision to issue a search
warrant is a judicial decision.
Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 1109-10.
115. 917 A.2d 856 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
116. Martinez, 917 A.2d at 859-60. Martinez had plead guilty to multiple counts of vari-
ous narcotics offenses. Id. at 858. Martinez was a top aide in the Controller's Office in the
City-County Building in Pittsburgh and was accused of selling cocaine from his office. Id.
The sentencing court failed to impose the mandatory minimum sentence by the Common-
wealth and instead sentenced Martinez to three to six years incarceration. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 858.
119. Id. The Post-Gazette asserted in its Petition to Intervene and Motion for Access to
Judicial Records that "the public has a paramount right to evaluate the activities of its
officials and there is a public interest in knowing whether any elected or appointed officials
wrote to the [c]ourt in an attempt to excuse or minimize Mr. Martinez's breach of the public
trust." Id.
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were public judicial documents subject to the common-law right of
access. 120
In determining whether the common-law right of access applied,
the court followed the two-step process set forth in Fenster-
maker. 121 The court determined that the letters were judicial in
character since the sentencing court used them in their sentencing
proceedings. 122 Next, the court cited the policy considerations
listed in Fenstermaker, including the public's interest in observing
criminal proceedings and encouraging public confidence in the
judicial process, and concluded that the letters were public in na-
ture. 123 Stating that the opposing party failed to allege any coun-
tervailing factors to outweigh the presumption of openness, the
court then granted the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette access to the let-
ters. 12
4
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was again asked to establish
the parameters of public judicial documents in Commonwealth v.
Long. 125 The criminal proceedings against Long, who was on trial
for the murder of his wife, gave rise to the common-law right of
access issue. 126 The Tribune-Review Publishing Company and
WPXI filed a motion to intervene, requesting access to the jurors'
names and addresses. 127 The jury selection process, in which each
potential juror was referred to only by a number, had been open to
120. Id. at 860. The sentencing court argued that the letters were not public judicial
documents since they were not filed with the court or entered into evidence during the
hearing. Id. at 859. The Pittsburgh Post-Gazette alleged that the letters were public judi-
cial documents as the sentencing court based its sentencing decision upon them. Id. at 860.
121. Martinez, 917 A.2d at 860. The court noted that there were no prior Pennsylvania
cases addressing whether letters given to a sentencing court were public judicial records or
documents. Id at 860.
122. Id. at 861. The court made note of the fact that the court's determination that the
letters given to the sentencing court were public judicial records or documents was in con-
formance with federal cases. Id at 862.
123. Id. at 862.
Given the open nature of criminal trials, and sentencing proceedings in par-
ticular, we find that letters submitted to a sentencing court by defense counsel
at the time of sentencing, which the sentencing court explicitly reviews in
preparation for sentencing, are public judicial documents regardless of whether
the sentencing court formally dockets the letters.
Id. at 861-62.
124. Id. at 863.
125. 922 A.2d 892 (Pa. 2007).
126. Long, 922 A.2d at 894. The court did mention that there was an overlap between
the common-law right to access public judicial documents and First Amendment rights, but
stated that as a policy consideration the court considers non-constitutional grounds first.
Id. at 897-98.
127. Id. at 895. The Tribune-Review Publishing Company and WPXI Inc. reporters first
attempted to obtain the names and addresses through the court's judicial staff. Id.
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the public, and at least one reporter from both the Tribune-Review
Publishing Company and WPXI were present. 128
Applying the test set forth in Fenstermaker, the court first
looked to see if the jurors' names and addresses were judicial in
character. 129 The court found that, because the impaneled jurors'
names and addresses did not become part of the record or other-
wise made available to the public and because the jurors' names
and addresses were not information upon which the judge based a
decision, the names and addresses were not judicial in charac-
ter. 130 Thus, there was no common-law right to access the jurors'
names and addresses. 131
Throughout the lineage of cases in Pennsylvania involving the
common-law right of access to public judicial documents and re-
cords, the courts have consistently applied the two-part test first
set forth in Fenstermaker in 1987.132 With regard to the first part
of the test, there has been some speculation as to what documents
and records fit within the definition of a public judicial record or
document. As the caselaw involving this common-law right devel-
ops, more documents and records will either be added to or ex-
cluded from the list classifying such documents or records as pub-
lic. It is conceivable that in a few years the majority of documents
and records that courts handle on a regular basis will be classi-
fied, with perhaps only a few rare exceptions still to be deter-
mined.
Despite the Pennsylvania courts' consistency with regard to the
first part of the Fenstermaker test, there has been extensive de-
bate over its second portion. This second part involves the balanc-
ing of the public's interests against the defendant's right to a fair
trial and the privacy concerns of those involved. Based upon the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Upshur III, it is
readily apparent that each justice wants to give different weights
to the interests involved when applying the balancing test. '33
In Upshur III, the Commonwealth argued that the jury pool
would be polluted and the defendant's right to a fair trial would be
compromised by the release of public judicial records and docu-
ments during the trial. 134 Justice Fitzgerald expressed a similar
128. Id. at 894.
129. Id. at 898.
130. Id.
131. Long, 922 A.2d at 898.
132. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d 414.
133. Upshur III, 924 A.2d 642.
134. Brief for Appellee at 4, Upshur IHf, 924 A.2d 642 (No. 02 WAP 2006).
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concern in his dissenting opinion, stating that providing the media
with copies of the actual record or document during a trial could
severely undermine the integrity of the trial. 3 5 While it is cer-
tainly a possibility that the broadcast of certain judicial records
and documents could prejudice potential jurors, it is not likely
that it would have such a substantial affect as to render a trial
unfair. Such is the conclusion reached by the majority, which
stated that pretrial publicity on its own is not enough to render a
trial unfair.136 Therefore, the danger of pretrial publicity, the ma-
jority posits, is of little weight when considering the public's com-
mon-law right of access to public judicial records and docu-
ments. 1
37
Another area of disagreement in applying the Fenstermaker
balancing test is over how much weight should be given to the pri-
vacy concerns of those involved. It is fairly common for a defen-
dant, especially in a criminal trial, to be subjected to publicity
both before and after the trial. However, the privacy rights of the
victim's family and of other people shown on videotapes or heard
on audiotapes must be considered. In her concurring opinion, Jus-
tice Baldwin expressed concern over the decreased privacy of the
other people involved and the victim's family, and noted that in
many cases where access was granted, the defendant was a public
figure. 138 Justice Baldwin placed great weight upon the individu-
als' privacy concerns, whereas the majority treated these indi-
viduals' privacy as incidental to the public's common-law right of
access.' 3 9 Before and during the trial, such publicity may subject
the victim's family and other people featured on the video or au-
diotape to public scrutiny, but the effects of such publicity, absent
a celebrity defendant or public figure, will diminish after the trial.
Additionally, such publicity for the victim's family and other par-
ticipants does not necessarily harm them, as Justice Baldwin con-
tested. Publicity may lead others within their community to reach
out to the family and help support them through a difficult time.
Moreover, there has also been much debate as to whether the
common-law right of access to public judicial documents and re-
cords guarantees access to the content or a copy of the document
or record. This dispute may not have arisen were it not for the
135. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 659 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 652 (majority opinion).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 657 (Baldwin, J., concurring).
139. Id. at 656.
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fact that in almost every case involving the common-law right of
access in Pennsylvania it was the media who was seeking access
to the public judicial documents or records.
It is interesting to note that while the common-law right of ac-
cess predates the Federal Constitution, 140 the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court did not address the right until 1987. This may be
due to the invention of modern technology and the ease with
which documents and records can be copied using such technol-
ogy.' 4 ' Additionally, however, the invention of mass communica-
tions by way of the television in the 1930s142 and video recording
in the 1970s 143 made the common-law right of access more appeal-
ing to the media as a means for getting information for broadcast
purposes.
The purposes for granting access to the public originated when
the common-law right came into existence in 1372 England, 144 a
time and place when there were few, if any, media sources. Thus,
its creators did not necessarily contemplate the media's use of
such documents and records. The public has a right to inspect and
copy documents to further the purposes behind the common-law
right, such as assuring evenhanded justice, preventing bias, pre-
venting individuals from taking the law into their own hands, sat-
isfying the natural desire to see that justice is done, and promot-
ing public confidence and understanding in the government and
judicial system. 45 However, the media seeks access to inspect
and copy public judicial records and documents for commercial
gain, not to promote justice or protect the government. The re-
lease of copies of public judicial documents and records does not
directly bolster the purposes originally cited to support the com-
mon-law right.
On the other hand, the broadcast of the actual evidence may
further the purposes behind the right because it gives the public
an opportunity to review public judicial documents and records,
which would not otherwise be available due to practical reasons. 146
140. Marburger, supra note 65, at 647.
141. Id. at 653.
142. Jeff Sharp, Coming Soon to Pay-Per-View: How the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act Enables Digital Content Owners to Circumvent Educational Fair Use, 40 AM. BUS. L.J.
1, 20 (2002).
143. Sharp, supra note 142, at 19.
144. Marburger, supra note 65, at 650.
145. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 417.
146. Marburger, supra note 65, at 670. "[B]roadcast of actual evidence permits more
people to view and evaluate the trial evidence than could otherwise see or hear it because of
practical limitations on public attendance at trials." Id.
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Whereas, in the past, it may have been common practice to ob-
serve courtroom proceedings and examine the documents and re-
cords, today this is highly unlikely. Without media dissemination
of public judicial records and documents, the common-law right of
access would virtually become obsolete. The right has evolved to
fit the changing needs of society. The media, as the public's repre-
sentative, furthers those purposes contemplated by the common-
law right of access. Therefore, it is not the media's interests, fu-
eled by economic incentive, being weighed, but rather the public's
interest as a whole in the workings of the government. There is a
danger that the media will misrepresent information obtained via
the common-law right of access or take the information out of con-
text, but there are also deterrents, such as civil liability or harm to
the media's reputation and profits. 1
47
The media's use of the common-law right of access has created
disagreement within the Pennsylvania Supreme Court as to
whether the right guarantees access to the content or access to a
copy of a public judicial record or document. It is the position of
some Justices that the form of the record or document may ad-
versely affect privacy and right to fair trial concerns without in-
creasing the benefits of the purposes behind the common-law right
of access. Justice Castille stated that the common-law right of
access guarantees only a right to the content. 148 In his concurring
opinion, he stated that courts are not required to give the media
the information in a form that is best suited for programming or
rating purposes. 149 Justice Baldwin agreed that the content is all
that is necessary to conform with the common-law right. 150
Nowhere in the caselaw does the court create a distinction be-
tween the media and the public. The public's common-law right of
access is exactly the same as the media's. 151 Throughout the de-
velopment of the common-law right to access, no limitations have
been placed upon what the public can do with public judicial
documents or records. Such concerns only have arisen as a result
of the media's intention to broadcast the public judicial records in
relation to privacy and to fair trial concerns. However, what is to
147. Id. at 666.
148. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 654 (Castille, J., concurring).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 655 (Baldwin, J., concurring). Justice Baldwin believed that "there is no
requirement that a television station be permitted access to the most dramatic or sensa-
tional version of a judicial document." Id.
151. Id. at 646 n.3 (majority opinion). "The scope of the right of access for the news
media is identical to that of the general public." Id.
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stop every member of the public from going to the courthouse and
reviewing the public judicial documents or records? The media is
not the only source of mass communications. The Internet has
provided the public with a means of communicating with a
broader range of people than was previously possible. Sites such
as youtube.com and thesmokinggun.com, and even e-mail mes-
sages, are used by the public to share documents, videos, and au-
dio of subjects of interest. Therefore, regardless of whether it is
the media or an individual exercising the right of access, the judi-
cial record or document will still be widely disseminated among
the public.
The underlying purposes behind the common-law right are
thought to be so fundamentally important that they outweigh the
potential downsides to releasing such information. Were the
courts to start denying the right to copy public judicial documents
and records, the underlying purposes behind the common-law
right of access would be hindered, rather than furthered. 152 Public
perception would be that the judiciary was hiding something or, at
the very least, trying to distance itself from the public. This "us
and them" mentality between the courts and the public is exactly
what the common-law right of access attempts to prevent. More-
over, proceedings are open to the public, which means anyone can
hear an audiotape or see a videotape at a proceeding. To deny ac-
cess to inspect and copy such original items would discriminate
between members of the public and infringe upon the common-law
right of those for whom it was impractical to physically go to the
courtroom.
Furthermore, controlling the form of information released pro-
vides a safeguard for privacy and protects the right to fair trial.
Then again, a safeguard has already been provided against the
common-law right of access. Where the public's interest is out-
weighed by individual concerns, such as privacy and the right to a
fair trial, the record is sealed, thereby preventing release of the
document or record. 153 Perhaps, instead of trying to change the
152. Marburger, supra note 65, at 652. "Courts viewed the right to copy the records as
the necessary corollary to the right to inspect, on the theory that the right to inspect would
be of little value without the more meaningful perusal which results from the right to copy
the records." Id.
153. Fenstermaker, 530 A.2d at 420. "Where the presumption of openness attached to a
public judicial document is outweighed by circumstances warranting closure of the docu-
ment to public inspection, access to the document may be denied." Id. The court noted
some circumstances that may warrant nondisclosure, including:
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presumption of openness and infringe upon the common-law right
of access, the courts should improve the safeguard already pre-
sent. The decision whether to seal the record is a matter of discre-
tion for the trial court to be based upon the circumstances sur-
rounding each case.154 However, there are no guidelines to deter-
mine the weight of each policy or individual consideration. 155
Therefore, more direction may be required as to what factors are
to be given greater weight.
The presumption of openness is just that-a presumption that
public judicial records and documents will be available for the
public's review. Where limitations begin to be imposed upon the
common-law right of access, the presumption of openness is no
longer "open," but rather an illusion of openness. To reduce the
common-law right of access to such a farce would frustrate the
purposes the right was designed to promote.
Ultimately, the Pennsylvania courts recognize a presumption in
favor of public access to view and copy public judicial records and
documents.156 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court clearly deline-
ated the test for determining whether public access was required
in Fenstermaker, which has been consistently applied throughout
the cases concerning the common-law right. Although the deter-
mination as to what documents and records constitute public judi-
cial records and documents has been fairly straightforward, the
application of the balancing test has proven more difficult. The
tape or transcript concern in Upshur III directly relates to privacy
and to fair trial concerns. Releasing an actual copy of the record
or document subordinates the privacy and fair trial concerns of
individuals. On the other hand, release of the transcript gives
greater weight to privacy and fair trial considerations. Until the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court makes a clear determination as to
Sixth Amendment fair trial rights of the defendant that might be affected by
pretrial publicity arising from disclosure of the affidavits, the need of the prose-
cution to protect the safety of informants, the necessity of preserving the integ-
rity of ongoing criminal investigations, the availability of reasonable alterna-
tive means to protect the interests threatened by disclosure, etc.
Id.
154. Id.
155. Upshur III, 924 A.2d at 654 (Castille, J., concurring). "With respect to balancing
relevant policy factors, as outined in this Court's opinion in Commonwealth v. Fenster-
maker ... I see room for reasonable disagreement." Id. Justice Castille believed that the
balancing analysis done by the majority was no more convincing that the balancing analy-
sis done by the superior court. Id.
156. Id. at 653 (majority opinion).
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how much weight should be given to privacy, the right to a fair
trial, and other concerns, the debate will continue.
Nicole L. Klos
